The 1990s saw a rapid increase in the number of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid managed care. By 2000, 56% of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in some type of managed care program in 49 states (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS] 2000), compared to 10% in 1991 (CMS 1995) .
1 State governments viewed Medicaid managed care as a means both to improve access to care for beneficiaries and to slow the growth in Medicaid expenditures (Holahan et al. 1998) .
Implementation of Medicaid managed care has occurred in two distinct phases. The first phase occurred in the 1980s when several states (e.g., Utah and Michigan) implemented plans in which enrollees' care was managed by primary care physicians. Under these primary care case management (PCCM) plans, providers were paid a monthly fee for overseeing the care received by individual Medicaid enrollees, but services still were paid on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis. In fact, Medicaid PCCM was an innovation that later was incorporated into private health plans as ''gatekeeping.'' During this early phase of interest in Medicaid managed care, states were focused primarily on using managed care as a means of improving access (Freund and Hurley 1987) .
The notion that Medicaid could use managed care to control program costs did not take hold until rapid growth in Medicaid expenditures emerged as an issue in the early 1990s (Holahan et al. 1993) . Between 1988 and 1994, Medicaid spending per enrollee for adults and children grew by about 9% annually (Liska et al. 1996) . Armed with research on Medicaid managed care experiences from the previous decade that showed some potential for savings (Hurley, Freund, and Paul 1993) , many states sought waivers to allow them to expand Medicaid managed care. During this second phase of Medicaid managed care implementation, states most often relied on contracts with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that were paid a capitated rate for providing a contractually specified set of services. Several states had expectations of savings that were so large that they simultaneously proposed using these savings to expand eligibility for Medicaid (Holahan et al. 1995) . In the rush to spend these expected savings, most states overlooked the fact that Medicaid fee-for-service rates already were well below those of private payers (Norton 1995) and that the potential for Medicaid plans to generate savings through provider discounts was much more limited than in the private sector. In the end, research showed that major savings did not materialize (Ormond, Ku, and Bruen 2001) and a number of states dropped, scaled back, or froze eligibility expansions (Brown et al. 2001) . However, the question of how Medicaid managed care affects beneficiaries' access and use of services remains open.
These two phases of implementation have resulted in considerable variation across states in the types of Medicaid managed care programs adopted. As Table 1 illustrates, by 1997 (the year covered in this study), most states had mandatory enrollment in some or all of their counties. Among states with mandatory enrollment, most large states and those with mature programs require enrollment into fully capitated HMOs, especially in urban areas. These include established programs in Minnesota, Tennessee, and Washington, as well as newer and expanding efforts in California, Missouri, and New York. However, many states still rely solely on PCCM in some counties. States with Medicaid managed care programs built solely around mandatory PCCM are predominantly rural compared to the nation as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau 1995). 2 Some states combine elements of HMO and PCCM models by requiring enrollment into managed care, but allowing beneficiaries to choose among types of programs. Such diversity in the implementation of Medicaid managed care provides an opportunity to analyze the effects of the different types of programs on Medicaid beneficiaries.
In this analysis, we use data from the 1997 National Survey of America's Families (NSAF) to explore the effects of the various types of mandatory Medicaid managed care approaches on beneficiary access and use. We compare adults and children in each type of mandatory Medicaid managed care program to those in the fee-for-service portion of Medicaid and to lowincome individuals with private health insurance. The following section briefly reviews the previous literature on Medicaid managed care and lays out the conceptual framework within which to consider differences in the effects of the various approaches to Medicaid managed care. We then describe the data, focusing specifically on how Medicaid managed care enrollees are identified, and discuss the specification of the econometric models used to contrast Medicaid managed care enrollees to the two comparison groups. After presenting the results, we examine the implications of our findings and highlight lessons that could be applied to the future evolution of Medicaid managed care programs.
Earlier Literature on Medicaid Managed Care
One of the first major reviews of Medicaid managed care research was prepared by Hurley, Freund, and Paul (1993) . This synthesis examined evidence on 25 programs that varied according to their inclusion of PCCM or HMOs, the nature of provider risk sharing, and reliance on voluntary or mandatory enrollment. The evidence suggested that, in this early era, Medicaid managed care was associated with reduced use of emergency rooms, prescription drugs, and hospital care relative to the FFS program. There was, however, no broad evidence that the level of physician use decreased. The authors suggested that physician visits did not decline because there were incentives for more visits in PCCM programs that relied on FFS payment approaches.
Throughout the 1990s, the literature on Medicaid managed care continued to grow. A review of 130 studies by the Kaiser Commission on the Future of Medicaid (Rowland et al. 1995) confirmed the Hurley, Freund, and Paul synthesis showing that Medicaid managed care reduced emergency room use but had no effect on physician visits. However, the Kaiser review also found reduced use of specialists' care, but only minimal changes in preventive care or hospital use. More recent findings from Section 1115 waiver programs that started in the mid-1990s and were built primarily around mandatory HMOs did not always confirm the effects of Medicaid managed care seen in the earlier and smaller evaluations (e.g., Mitchell et al. 1999) . As has been pointed out, however, methods for assessing the effects of moving from fee-for-service Medicaid to managed care are difficult to develop and, as a result, may not be robust (Gold 1999) .
However, beyond methodological issues, there are other reasons to have expected that the effects found in the earlier Medicaid managed care programs would differ from those of more recent efforts. First, in the 1980s, Medicaid was implementing managed care in a health care market in which most privately insured individuals were still in fee-for-service plans. In the 1990s, managed care was widely implemented by all payers. Therefore, the 1980s Medicaid approach was likely to deviate from the status quo to a greater degree than Medicaid managed care in the 1990s. Second, by the late 1990s, overall savings from managed care leveled off as utilization reductions became more difficult to sustain. Third, in the 1990s, Medicaid managed care was often part of a broader reform of the Medicaid program that included eligibility expansions; as a result, isolating the effects of managed care became more difficult.
Our goal is to go beyond most previous studies that examined Medicaid managed care on a program-by-program basis and to analyze average policy effects from a national perspective. We recognize that Medicaid managed care is by no means the same policy in all states and cannot be considered as such. Nevertheless, trying to recognize the potential uniqueness of each state program would lead us to retrace the paths of many of the earlier studies. Moreover, it would not use the available nationally representative data to explore the broader implications of Medicaid managed care as a policy approach. In this study, we estimate the national average effects of the various types of mandatory Medicaid managed care programs.
Conceptual Framework
As discussed previously, Medicaid programs have two basic choices with respect to plan type when developing managed care policies. Beneficiaries can be required to enroll in an HMO that has agreed to provide a contractually specified set of services in exchange for a capitation payment. Alternatively, they can be required to select a primary care physician who has agreed to serve as a case manager in exchange for a monthly fee. Typically, the monthly fees in these primary care case manager models have been quite low (e.g., about $3 per member per month), with all other services paid on a feefor-service basis. As Table 1 illustrates, some states choose exclusively between one of the two models, while others operate a combined program by giving beneficiaries the option of enrolling in an HMO or signing up with PCCM. States may vary the types of programs they implement across counties and, as such, may appear in multiple categories.
The incentives that providers face under the HMO and PCCM models are quite different. PCCMs are only a small step away from the traditional Medicaid program. Theoretically, under a PCCM model, beneficiaries should be more aware of who they should see when they need nonurgent care and this could improve access to primary care. The biggest effect of PCCM models relative to fee-for-service Medicaid could be with respect to access to these providers if patients are required to have a referral to receive specialty care. However, because PCCM providers are not at financial risk for the total costs associated with treating Medicaid beneficiaries-as is the case for HMOstheir incentives to seek out beneficiaries, provide preventive care, and restrict specialty care may be limited. Fundamentally, PCCM providers still are guided largely by Medicaid fee-forservice payment rates. These rates continue to be quite low relative to those of other payers (Norton and Zuckerman 2000) and have been identified as a major cause of the access problems often experienced by Medicaid beneficiaries (Mitchell 1991) . However, research has shown that PCCM increased the chances of a beneficiary seeing a physician relative to traditional Medicaid in the late 1980s (Hurley, Freund, and Paul 1993) . More recent evidence on PCCMs in the context of a health care market that is more dominated by other forms of managed care suggest that Medicaid PCCMs have little effect on the likelihood that a beneficiary sees a physician (Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane 2001) .
Medicaid HMOs are likely to be quite different than PCCMs, because HMOs are typically at risk for the costs of most, but not all, Medicaid-covered services.
3 As a result, Medicaid HMOs have an incentive to see patients before they need the most expensive types of care. This could encourage greater outreach on the part of plans to schedule well-child visits or adult preventive care, such as Pap smears, than would have occurred under FFS Medicaid. 4 It also could lead to the development of more userfriendly systems of primary care (e.g., weekend or evening office hours) to avoid the costs of unnecessary emergency room visits. However, not all of the incentives associated with capitation payments have positive implications for patient care. Once a health plan receives a monthly capitation payment on behalf of a beneficiary, there may be an incentive to limit various types of care (Blomqvist 1991) . For example, limiting diagnostic testing could reduce the chances of uncovering medical problems that potentially could be costly to treat. This is true in all capitated managed care plans, regardless of the source of payment. It is for this reason that Medicaid programs often develop comprehensive contract requirements and impose external review of plan operations, but these are not perfect (Rosenbaum et al. 1997) . Although there is a clear economic and contractual incentive on the part of Medicaid HMOs to see that beneficiaries receive certain types of care, the potential for limiting care makes predictions about the impact of Medicaid HMOs uncertain.
Understanding the impact of Medicaid managed care programs built solely around HMOs and those built solely around PCCM is challenging. However, the reality of the Medicaid policy world is even more complex. Some states operate combined programs in which both an HMO and PCCM are available in the same county. When this is the case, beneficiaries are required to select one of the two programs when they enroll. For those who do not choose, it is most common for them to be assigned to a PCCM provider (Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane 2001) . However, in some states, beneficiaries are assigned to PCCM or an HMO either randomly or based on place of residence. Expectations about the effects of these programs may depend on which of the two basic forms of Medicaid managed care tends to dominate.
The potential effects of these combined Medicaid managed care systems are hard to assess. Given that they contain both the HMO and PCCM models, it may be reasonable to expect the effects of a combined system to be somewhere between the two basic models. However, if having a choice of models allows beneficiaries to stay in the system that they think will best meet their needs, then it may be that combined systems produce more positive results for beneficiaries than either model on its own. 5 In particular, this could hold for concepts such as confidence in getting care and satisfaction with care that rely on beneficiaries' perceptions of the services they receive. Ultimately, it is an empirical question as to how these combined programs compare to traditional fee-for-service Medicaid, private insurance, or either of the two individual models of Medicaid managed care.
While the potential effects of the different types of Medicaid managed care relative to the traditional Medicaid program are likely to be the most relevant question for Medicaid policymakers, it may be that traditional Medicaid is not the only, or even the best, comparison point. In light of historical access problems within the traditional Medicaid program (Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell 1978; Mitchell 1991; Fossett et al. 1992; Newacheck et al. 1998) , it is also desirable to contrast access and use under Medicaid managed care with access and use among the low-income privately insured. Comparisons to the low-income privately insured also could shed light on the extent to which Medicaid managed care is bringing beneficiaries into mainstream health plans and equalizing access and use across public and private insurance. The ability to consider this additional comparison group is one of the major strengths of the NSAF data upon which this study is based, and is what distinguishes this analysis from other surveybased studies that may not provide a low-income oversample.
Data and Methodology
The primary data source for this study is the 1997 National Survey of America's Families, fielded as a component of the Assessing the New Federalism (ANF) project at the Urban Institute. NSAF is a household survey that collects economic, household, and health information on more than 100,000 children and noninstitutionalized adults. It collects data from a nationally representative sample of households from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The survey was conducted from February to November of 1997. The primary sampling method for the NSAF was a random selection of telephone numbers. However, a sample of households without telephones also was included. In addition, the survey oversampled low-income families (i.e., families with incomes less than 200% of the federal poverty level [FPL] ), in order to perform more detailed analyses of this population. The NSAF collected information on a variety of health care issues, including health insurance coverage, type of health insurance, and access to and utilization of health care services.
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A more detailed overview of the survey is contained in Kenney, Scheuren, and Wang (1999) ; for health care portions of the survey see .
The second data source used in this study is a 1998 Urban Institute survey of state Medicaid officials (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Schirmer 1999) . This mail survey with telephone followup collected county-level information regarding the type of Medicaid managed care program in each county (HMO vs. PCCM), whether each program was voluntary or mandatory, and the start and end (if applicable) dates of implementation and operation for each program. Having the program dates allows for the development of historical profiles of each county's Medicaid managed care program. These data are used to assess the credibility of responses to the NSAF questions on health plan characteristics and, in conjunction with these responses, to define a set of analytic variables related to Medicaid managed care enrollment and program type.
This study focuses on the effects of Medicaid managed care programs that require mandatory enrollment because these programs have been the ones that most states have relied on over the past decade. Since most states do not require enrollment for Medicaid beneficiaries receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and/or Medicare, we exclude these beneficiaries from consideration in this study. In addition, to keep the analysis focused on mandatory programs, we do not examine Medicaid beneficiaries living in counties with a voluntary Medicaid managed care program. This also eliminates potential selection bias that could result from beneficiaries in counties with voluntary programs choosing between managed care and fee-for-ser-vice options based on their expected health care needs.
The potential analytic sample included 2,908 adults and 5,674 children receiving Medicaid, and 9,543 adults and 6,616 children with low incomes and private health insurance. 7 However, because the utilization measures in the analysis relate to use during the 12-month period preceding the NSAF, we included only those adults and children who received Medicaid or who had private insurance for that entire period in the analytic samples. We recognize that this decision encompasses an analytic trade-off between possible bias in the sample and measurement error. By excluding people who moved in and out of coverage categories during the year, we focus on a somewhat worse-off subset of Medicaid beneficiaries and a somewhat better-off subset of the privately insured than is represented in the potential analytic sample. However, by making this exclusion, we improve the correspondence between the period of insurance coverage and the period for which we measure utilization. The final samples consisted of 2,345 adults and 5,073 children enrolled in Medicaid, and 7,598 adults and 5,659 children with low incomes and private health insurance.
NSAF uses three key questions to identify Medicaid managed care enrollees. The first asks a selected family member whether any family member is enrolled in the Medicaid program. If the respondent indicates that someone in the family is enrolled in Medicaid, the respondent is asked on a person-by-person basis which family members are enrolled. A follow-up question then asks whether family members enrolled in Medicaid are enrolled in an HMO. If the response indicates that the family member is not enrolled in an HMO, a third question asks whether the family member can go to any doctor or clinic that will accept Medicaid or whether that person must choose from a directory or list of doctors. This third question is designed to identify people enrolled in PCCM and looser forms of HMOs, such as network-based plans. The NSAF approach tries to avoid jargon yet capture the essential features of insurance arrangements that would allow us to classify Medicaid enrollees as being in managed care. If the responses to these questions suggest that the beneficiary is not enrolled in managed care, NSAF classifies that person as being in the feefor-service portion of Medicaid. 8 Since the goal of this study is to examine the effects of enrollment in each of the various forms of Medicaid managed care, it is also necessary to distinguish among enrollees according to program type. However, the broad array of Medicaid managed care models and program names makes it difficult to develop survey questions that accurately categorize people by type of program. Most of the jargon of Medicaid managed care that may be familiar to the health policy community cannot be credibly used in surveys of the general population. Therefore, we rely on the 1998 Urban Institute survey of Medicaid managed care policies to distinguish among program types. A strength of this analysis is that we can use both responses from NSAF and county-level data on Medicaid managed care programs to classify Medicaid managed care enrollees by program type.
By bringing together NSAF and the countylevel survey, we also can assess the consistency of information provided by the respondents with information provided by the states. As Table 2 shows, respondents residing in a county where the state requires mandatory enrollment in an HMO or PCCM seem to recognize that they are in Medicaid managed care. Of those NSAF adults reporting enrollment in some type of Medicaid managed care plan, about 57% live in a mandatory HMO county, 7% in a mandatory PCCM county, and 24% in a county with a mandatory choice between an HMO or PCCM. However, for some people reporting Medicaid managed care enrollment there are small discrepancies between the NSAF responses and the county data. Only 13% of adults reporting Medicaid managed care on the NSAF live in a county with no mandatory Medicaid managed care program in place. Similarily, only 15% of children identified as enrolled in Medicaid managed care on the NSAF live in counties with no mandatory Medicaid managed care. We address this type of reporting inconsistancy in the ''Model Specification'' section and in the endnotes.
However, these data also raise some questions about including all people who NSAF does not identify as Medicaid managed care enrollees in a fee-for-service comparison group. These questions do not pertain to the 60% of children and 54% of adults who are Medicaid beneficiaries, Medicaid beneficiaries who do not report being enrolled in managed care but live in a county with mandatory enrollment are comprised of two groups. First, there are those who are legitimately exempted and excluded from the mandatory enrollment requirement (Hurley 1999) . These people are accurately reporting that they remain in the fee-for-service part of the Medicaid program and can be treated as fee-for-service beneficiaries in this study. Second, there are beneficiaries who actually are enrolled in a managed care plan, but do not report this through NSAF. Some of these people may have been enrolled through auto-enrollment and may not realize that they are in managed care, while others simply may respond incorrectly to the survey questions. Unfortunately, the NSAF data do not allow us to separate these two subgroups of respondents or assess the relative size of each group. As part of the model specification, we explored how sensitive our results would be to including in the FFS comparison group both the legitimate FFS beneficiaries in counties with mandatory managed care enrollment and those providing potentially inconsistent responses.
Model Specification
To measure the effect of being enrolled in one of the three types of Medicaid managed care programs, we estimate multivariate regression models of access and utilization. Separate models are estimated for adults and children. For each group, we posit that access and utilization are determined by demographic, economic, and market factors as well as enrollment in Medicaid managed care. In models that use Medicaid beneficiaries remaining in the FFS component of the program as the comparison group for the managed care enrollees, the regression estimates are based on a sample including only Medicaid beneficiaries. When we use the low-income privately insured population as an alternative comparison group, we estimate models based on a sample including all Medicaid beneficiaries (both those in managed care and the fee-for-service components of the program) as well as the low-income privately insured population.
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In both sets of models, we use the same access and utilization variables as dependent variables. The access measures are whether an individual has access to a usual source of care, and if so, the location of that care: a doctor's office, clinic, or hospital emergency room. The utilization measures relate to the 12 months preceding the survey and capture whether a person had at least one visit to a doctor, health professional, dentist, or emergency room or was admitted to a hospital for a nonmaternity overnight stay. For adult women, we use two common Note: Except for the number of well-child visits, all figures represent the percentage of people who respond in the affirmative. a The samples used for these estimates are limited to children and adults with a usual source of care. For the Medicaid estimates, the samples consisted of 4,878 children and 2,104 adults. For the low-income privately insured estimates, the samples consisted of 5,438 children and 6,756 adults. b ''Other health care provider visit'' includes visits to nurse practitioners, physician's assistants, or midwives. c The sample used for these estimates is limited to adult women. N ϭ 2,004 for the Medicaid estimates and N ϭ 4,699 for the low-income privately insured estimates. measures of preventive care: whether the woman had a clinical breast examination or a Pap smear in the preceding 12 months. For children, the measures of preventive care are whether the child had a well-child visit in the preceding 12 months and the number of visits. We also examine unmet need for medical care, dental care, and prescription drugs, based on affirmative responses to a question asking whether the adult or child did not receive or postponed getting these types of health care. Finally, we explore respondents' perceptions regarding health care through two questions asking whether they are confident in their family's ability to obtain needed care or satisfied with the quality of care received. Respondents who report not being confident at all or not being too confident are classified as ''not confident;'' those reporting being very dissatisfied or somewhat dissatisfied are classified as ''not satisfied.'' Mean values for these dependent variables are presented in Table  3 for the Medicaid sample (managed care and fee-for-service combined) and for the low-income privately insured comparison group.
The three key independent variables for this study measure Medicaid managed care enrollment according to program type. 10 For those individuals reporting Medicaid managed care enrollment on the NSAF, we identify individuals: 1) living in a mandatory HMO county (hereafter referred to as individuals in mandatory HMOs); 2) living in a mandatory PCCM county (hereafter referred to as individuals in mandatory PCCM); and 3) living in a county where Med-icaid managed care is mandatory but where a choice exists between an HMO and PCCM (hereafter referred to as mandatory HMO/ PCCM). Unfortunately, although our countylevel data allow us to determine which Medicaid beneficiaries live in counties with this type of choice, the individual-level NSAF data do not allow us to determine who is enrolled in each type of plan within these counties. All Medicaid beneficiaries not reported as being in managed care on the NSAF are used as the Medicaid FFS comparison group. However, because of the potential inconsistency between the NSAF responses and county information evident in Table  2 , we conducted a sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of including both the consistent and potentially inconsistent NSAF responses in the comparison group.
As part of this sensitivity analysis, we estimated the effects of the various types of Medicaid managed care using alternative fee-for-service comparison groups. First, we included all Medicaid beneficiaries who did not report being enrolled in a managed care plan as FFS, even if they lived in a county with mandatory managed care enrollment. Then, we re-estimated the models excluding this latter group. We recognize that excluding people who were legitimately exempted or excluded from mandatory managed care enrollment, along with people who actually were enrolled but did not report this on NSAF, means that we would omit a valid portion of the fee-for-service group. However, this is the most feasible sensitivity analysis given the data. Although there were a limited number of differences across the two approaches, most findings were not affected by the composition of the feefor-service comparison group.
11 Therefore, in the results that follow we classify all Medicaid enrollees not indicating Medicaid managed care on the NSAF as fee-for-service beneficiaries (the comparison group for the questions related to effects within the Medicaid program), even if they lived in a county that had a mandatory Medicaid managed care program in place. To the extent that the inconsistent responses occurred because of measurement error, our ability to clearly identify Medicaid managed care enrollees and to detect differences between them and fee-for-service Medicaid enrollees would be weakened.
The other variables in the models have been found to influence access and use in numerous studies based on theoretical frameworks developed by Grossman (1972) and Aday and Anderson (1981) and serve as controls so that we can isolate the effect of Medicaid managed care. These variables include:
Ⅺ race/ethnicity (categorical variables for black, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; other, nonHispanic; and white, non-Hispanic (omitted group); Ⅺ gender (male is the omitted group); Ⅺ family income as a percentage of the federal poverty level; Ⅺ health status (excellent or very good; fair or poor; good is the omitted group); Ⅺ the presence of a limiting disability (none is the omitted group); Ⅺ citizenship (citizen is the omitted group); Ⅺ family structure (two-parent households comprise the omitted group); Ⅺ residence in an urban vs. rural area (residence in a rural county adjacent to a metropolitan county; residence in a rural county not adjacent to a metropolitan county; residence in a metropolitan county is the omitted group); Ⅺ the number of primary care physicians per capita in the county; and Ⅺ state indicators for each of the 13 Assessing the New Federalism states (the balance of the nation is the omitted group).
Given that all but one of the dependent variables are dichotomous indicators, most of the models are estimated using logistic regressions. Standard errors are calculated using a jackknife replication approach to account for the complex sample structure of the NSAF (Flores-Cervantes, Brick, and DiGaetano 1999). For the model that examines differences in the number of wellchild visits, ordinary least squares methods are applied, again using jackknife standard errors.
Results
The results from this analysis are grouped by type of Medicaid managed care program. In the three tables that follow, we present coefficient estimates (and standard errors) for the Medicaid managed care variables from the models estimated for each dependent variable. For those estimates derived from logistic regression mod- els, the marginal effect of the managed care variable also is shown. 12 The effects of mandatory HMOs are presented in Table 4 . Table 5 shows the estimated effects of mandatory PCCM, and Table 6 shows the estimated effects of mandatory programs that combine HMOs and PCCM. For each type of Medicaid managed care program, we first discuss results from comparisons with Medicaid FFS beneficiaries for children and adults. We then present findings from the comparisons between people with Medicaid managed care and the low-income privately insured.
Effects of Mandatory HMOs
Compared to Medicaid fee-for-service. The left side of Table 4 presents results for children and adults enrolled in mandatory HMO programs compared to those in Medicaid fee-for-service. As outlined earlier, mandatory HMOs are likely to face the greatest incentives to ensure that beneficiaries have access to a regular source of medical care. This seems to be borne out in the results. Compared to children and adults in Medicaid FFS, those enrolled in mandatory HMOs are less dependent on emergency rooms as a usual source of care. For adults in Medicaid HMOs, the shift away from emergency rooms is associated with a significantly higher probability of having a doctor's office as a usual source of care. However, for children, there are no significant differences related to having a doctor as a usual source of care. Such shifts in the usual sources of care illustrate the impact that HMOs can have in changing access for Medicaid beneficiaries.
The movement away from emergency rooms as a usual source of care for children and adults in Medicaid HMOs also may contribute to the higher probability of having a visit to a doctor experienced by both groups. The size of these differences can be quite large. Compared to those in Medicaid FFS, both adults and children in mandatory HMOs are approximately 10 percentage points more likely to have had a doctor visit in the 12 months preceding the survey.
Children in mandatory HMOs also are more likely to have had a visit to a dentist than children in FFS Medicaid; this translates into a lower probability of their parents reporting unmet dental needs. In addition to providing beneficiaries with a regular source of care, mandatory HMOs also have an incentive to provide preventive care to avoid potentially high-cost health care problems in the future. Our analysis suggests that this occurs with children in mandatory HMOs-they are much more likely to have had a well-child visit in the 12 months preceding the survey than children in fee-forservice Medicaid. This suggests that mandatory HMOs may be particularly good environments for children to receive preventive care.
However, not all of the findings with respect to mandatory HMOs point in an entirely optimistic direction for adults. Adults in mandatory HMOs are about nine percentage points less likely to have had a visit to a dentist than FFS beneficiaries. In addition, adults in mandatory HMOs are about six percentage points more likely to report unmet medical or surgical needs and 11 percentage points more likely to report unmet prescription drug needs compared to FFS beneficiaries.
Compared to low-income privately insured. For children in mandatory HMOs, most of the significant and potentially beneficial differences we observed relative to Medicaid fee-for-service beneficiaries are also evident in comparison to low-income privately insured children. Specifically, we find that children in mandatory HMOs are less likely to rely on an ER as a usual source of care. However, children in mandatory HMOs are significantly less likely to have a doctor's office as a usual source of care and more likely to have a clinic as a usual source of care. Children in mandatory HMOs are more likely to have had a doctor or dental visit and received well-child care than their low-income privately insured counterparts.
In contrast to the results for children, there are few significant differences between adults in mandatory HMOs and low-income adults with private insurance, and those differences tend to suggest deficiencies. Adults in mandatory Medicaid HMOs are less likely to have had a dental visit, more likely to have had unmet dental needs, and more likely to have had an ER visit than the low-income privately insured.
Effects of Mandatory PCCMs
Compared to Medicaid fee-for-service. The findings on the left side of Table 5 show while several key indicators of access and use among children enrolled in mandatory PCCM are sig-nificantly different from those among children in Medicaid FFS, there is only one significant difference among adults. Children in mandatory PCCM relative to those in Medicaid FFS are less likely to rely on an emergency room and more likely to have a physician's office as a usual source of care. This translates into a higher probability of seeing a physician or other health care provider for the mandatory PCCM children than for those in fee-for-service Medicaid. However, unlike mandatory HMOs, mandatory PCCM does not seem to be related to improvements in the probability of receiving preventive care for children. In addition, the parents of children in Medicaid PCCM plans (like those in mandatory HMOs) are more likely to report that the children had unmet prescription drug needs. Relative to adults in Medicaid FFS, those in mandatory PCCM are more likely to have some usual source of care. However, there is no evidence to suggest the type they have or whether having a usual source of care increases utilization.
Compared to the low-income privately insured. For children, results on the right side of Table 5 show that mandatory PCCM produces somewhat mixed, but on balance, positive results. On the negative side, children in mandatory PCCM are more likely to have an emergency room visit and to have unmet prescription drug needs than those with private insurance. However, despite not being more likely to have a physician or clinic as their usual source of care, the probability of seeing a physician, the probability of seeing another health professional, and the number of well-child visits are all higher among Medicaid children in mandatory PCCM compared to those covered by private health insurance.
When compared to the low-income privately insured, adults in mandatory PCCM are more likely to have an emergency room as their usual source of care and more likely to have had an emergency room visit. There are no significant effects of mandatory PCCM for any of the other utilization measures among adults. Adults in mandatory PCCM are less likely to report lacking confidence in their ability to get needed care and less likely to report that they are not satisfied with their care than the low-income privately insured.
Effects of Mandatory HMOs/PCCM
Compared to Medicaid fee-for-service. The left side of Table 6 presents results for children and adults related to the differences between enrollees in mandatory programs allowing a choice between an HMO or PCCM and those in Medicaid FFS. Given that these types of programs are likely to have a mixture of PCCM and HMO enrollees, one might expect the results to be somewhere in between the two sets of findings already reported. However, in some cases, results are similar to the mandatory HMO findings; in others, they are similar to mandatory PCCM, and still others are unlike either of the previous two models. It appears that the mixed nature of the systems may make any clear analysis and interpretation of the results difficult.
Children and adults in mandatory HMO/ PCCM counties are more likely to have a usual source of care than the Medicaid FFS comparison group. This potentially important access indicator was not observed in either the mandatory HMO or mandatory PCCM models. For both children and adults, we find that mandatory HMO/PCCM models also are associated with less reliance on emergency rooms as a usual source of care.
In this mixed Medicaid managed care model, the gains to having a usual source of care do not seem to be reflected in higher utilization rates, especially for doctor's visits. Children in the mixed programs are not more likely to visit a doctor in the preceding year than children in Medicaid FFS. However, these children have a higher rate of ER visits and visits to other health professionals than the FFS group. It is not possible to say whether these patterns of care produce an adequate and appropriate mix of health services. What is clear is that children in counties with a combination of HMOs and PCCM are not seeing the gains in terms of the chance of seeing a physician or receiving preventive care that we observed for children enrolled in mandatory HMOs and, to a lesser extent, children in mandatory PCCM. For adults, being in a mandatory HMO/PCCM county is associated with a lower probability of having an emergency room visit and a higher probability of having unmet dental needs relative to Medicaid FFS enrollees. The only evidence that adults have any increase in utilization (as measured in this Table 6 presents results for children and adults related to the differences between enrollees in mandatory programs allowing a choice between an HMO or PCCM and low-income individuals with private health insurance. Both adults and children are more likely to have a usual source of care when enrolled in a mandatory HMO/PCCM program than those low-income individuals with private health insurance. For those adults with a usual source of care, adults in mandatory HMO/ PCCM programs are less likely to depend on a doctor's office and more likely to have a clinic as their usual source of care than the low-income privately insured group. The pattern is similar for children. This significant shift toward clinics as a usual source of care does not lead to an increased likelihood of a physician visit for either adults or children in mandatory HMO/ PCCM programs relative to those with private insurance; in fact, the probability of seeing a physician is lower for adults. In terms of preventive care, however, we find a significantly higher probability of well-child visits. With respect to female preventive care, mandatory HMO/PCCM programs are associated with a higher probability of a Pap smear, but there is no effect on clinical breast exam relative to the low-income privately insured. Adults in mandatory HMO/PCCM programs also are more likely to have unmet dental needs than the privately insured, but less likely to lack confidence in their ability to get needed care.
Discussion and Conclusion
The impact of Medicaid managed care on beneficiaries' access and use varies across types of Medicaid managed care programs. The results comparing mandatory HMOs to Medicaid feefor-service suggest that these programs are achieving some of the key goals propounded by their supporters. This was particularly true for children in mandatory HMOs, who were less likely to depend on an ER as a usual source of care, more likely to see a doctor, more likely to see a dentist, and more likely to receive preventive care. For adults in mandatory HMOs, the higher probability of having a doctor as a usual source of care and visiting a doctor were somewhat offset by a lower rate of dental use, and higher rates of unmet medical and prescription drug needs.
Mandatory PCCM provides some benefits to children, but appears to have very little impact on adult Medicaid beneficiaries. Relative to Medicaid FFS, mandatory PCCM decreases children's dependence on ERs as a usual source of care and significantly improves their probability of receiving care from a physician. However, despite offering a ''medical home,'' the benefits of PCCM plans do not extend into the area of improvements in preventive care for children. States claimed that they moved away from PCCM models and toward making mandatory HMOs the dominant model of Medicaid managed care, in part, as a way of improving beneficiaries' patterns of access and use (Holahan et al. 1998) . For adults, this study suggests that the policy shift away from PCCM has significantly improved patterns of use. However, for children, PCCM already achieved some of the same basic goals as the HMO models of Medicaid managed care, suggesting that the shift to HMOs benefited children most by expanding utilization of preventive care and reducing unmet need for dental care.
Perhaps not surprisingly, our findings with respect to the mandatory HMO/PCCM programs are less clear and not very consistent across adults and children. Although there is evidence that these models are better at connecting beneficiaries with a usual source of care than Medicaid FFS and can improve continuity of care, there is no positive impact on the likelihood of having a physician for children or adults. 13 It is possible that some states chose to retain both the HMO and PCCM models because of concerns about HMO capacity in selected counties or because of opposition to relying solely on capitated plans. Whatever the reason, it appears that these mandatory HMO/PCCM models are not associated consistently with the benefits of mandatory HMOs or PCCM.
This study also shows that children in Medicaid managed care continue to rely on sets of providers as their usual sources of care that are different than low-income children who are privately insured. Across all three types of counties with managed care programs considered in this study, Medicaid children with a usual source of care were more likely to rely on clinics and less likely to have a doctor's office as their usual source than the low-income privately insured (although, the PCCM effect was not statistically significant). This may be the result of the inadequate supply of physicians in neighborhoods in which Medicaid enrollees live (Fossett et al. 1992) and an effort on the part of managed care plans to include traditional clinic providers in their networks. These findings suggest that the idea of using managed care to mainstream Medicaid children into the same systems of care available to the privately insured apparently was not adopted by 1997.
The reliance of children in Medicaid managed care plans on clinics should not necessarily be interpreted as a problem. Many clinics have a long history of treating Medicaid patients due to their location in low-income neighborhoods and may be more in tune with the needs of this population than an average physician's practice.
One particularly noteworthy result is that children in mandatory HMOs are significantly more likely than their privately insured counterparts to receive well-child care.
14 This could be due to benefit packages for low-income privately insured families that have high deductibles or limited coverage for preventive care or the fact that Medicaid beneficiaries receive this type of care through the Early Prevention Screening and Diagnostic Testing program.
Differences in patterns of health care use persist among adults across the Medicaid managed care and privately insured populations. Adults in mandatory HMO and mandatory PCCM programs remain significantly more likely to have had an emergency room visit in the 12 months preceding the survey than adults with private insurance. It is difficult to assess whether this reflects unmeasured differences in health status among enrollees in these programs, ingrained patterns of health care use, the timing and dates for Medicaid enrollment, or some combination of these factors. Future analyses may be able to examine whether emergency room use decreases as Medicaid HMOs and PCCM programs refine their patient education efforts and expand provider networks.
Although the higher probabilities of use under mandatory HMO models may be a positive outcome for beneficiaries, this may be at odds with the states' objective of maintaining control over Medicaid costs. This analysis does not examine the impact of mandatory HMOs on overall service volumes or state Medicaid expenditures. However, since children in mandatory HMOs are more likely to see a physician, this can result in the detection of health care needs that require additional follow-up care. If so, this could put pressure on plans' costs and make it difficult for states to hold HMO capitation rates below the costs of Medicaid FFS. From a budgetary standpoint, this might make mandatory HMOs a less attractive policy option than had been anticipated. From the HMO's perspective, if payments were not adequate to cover the costs of care, continued participation in the program could be seen as undesirable. Inadequate capitation rates and higher-than-expected costs have been cited as factors in withdrawals from Medicaid managed care markets in a variety of states .
Although the range of findings in this study do not lend themselves to drawing simple conclusions about the effects of Medicaid managed care, they do offer guidance to policymakers. First, this study shows that different approaches to Medicaid managed care-HMOs, PCCM, and combined programs-produce different effects on beneficiaries' access and use. As such, policymakers need to understand that they cannot shift between types of managed care without expecting consequences. Second, Medicaid managed care affects children differently than adults, with the positive effects more prevalent among children than among adults. Finally, and not surprisingly, assessments of the various forms of Medicaid managed care are dependent on what comparison groups are chosen. In this study, we tended to find more gains in beneficiary access and use among managed care beneficiaries relative to those in Medicaid FFS than we did relative to the privately insured. Overall, understanding the effects of Medicaid managed care will depend on the type of program being assessed, the types of beneficiaries who are enrolled, and the comparison group used as the counterfactual.
In assessing this study, there are two important caveats that readers should keep in mind. First, we report results based on groups of Medicaid managed care programs; the effects of programs in specific states or subsets of states may differ from these average effects. For example, it is possible that there is a subset of the mandatory HMO programs that is more effective than the overall set of mandatory HMO programs we examined, and its effects could differ from the group averages. Future studies might explore differences within these program types. Second, the access and use indicators that we used are broad survey-based measures and cannot capture all possible effects of the Medicaid managed care programs. For example, it was not possible with the data available to us to focus on small groups of patients with specific conditions or on indicators of appropriate treatment patterns related to these conditions due to small sample sizes and the limits of the survey content.
Even taking these caveats into account, this study suggests that mandatory HMO programs had a positive impact on children and produced some gains for adults, particularly when compared to Medicaid FFS enrollees. Mandatory PCCM programs, at least the approaches that had been implemented through 1997, exhibited benefits for children, but did little for adults, relative to Medicaid fee for service. Mandatory HMO/PCCM programs had almost as many drawbacks as there were strengths. We recognize that Medicaid managed care experienced rapid growth rates during the 1990s and some of the programs-especially those that combine the HMO and PCCM models-still may have been under development at the time these survey data were collected. As the Medicaid managed care market matures, in time such discrepancies may become less pronounced. These and other questions, such as the impact of Medicaid capitation rates on access and utilization, should be addressed in future studies. 1 By 1997 (the year covered by the data in this study), 48% of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care (CMS 2000) . 2 Research shows that states often have avoided trying to move beyond PCCM in rural areas because of inadequate provider supply, limited willingness of capitated plans to operate in rural areas, and a general lack of understanding of managed care concepts (Slifkin et al. 1998 ). 3 Many Medicaid programs do not require HMOs to contract to provide certain specialized services and, instead, carve these services out of the capitated rates and the HMOs' contractual obligations. Substance abuse and mental health care are often ''carve-out'' services (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Schirmer 1999) . 4 The incentive to invest in this type of preventive care is likely to be weaker for a Medicaid patient than for a privately insured patient because Medicaid beneficiaries are often eligible for relatively short periods of time (e.g., less than a year). This reduces the ability of the HMO to recover the costs of providing comprehensive preventive care to Medicaid patients by continuing to receive the monthly capitation payment when the beneficiary is enrolled but not in need of care. 5 Having a choice of model does not mean that beneficiaries in the combined systems of Medicaid managed care have a choice of not being in managed care. All of the beneficiaries in managed care in this analysis are in counties that require mandatory enrollment in some type of plan. 6 Other NSAF variables that are available include employment, earnings and income, educational attainment, participation in training activities, economic hardship, family structure, housing arrangements and cost, psychological well-being, participation in religious and volunteer activities, knowledge on the availability of social services, and attitudes about work, welfare, health care and childbearing. 7 This potential analytic sample of Medicaid beneficiaries includes all beneficiaries not receiving SSI and/or Medicare, not living in counties with voluntary Medicaid managed care programs, and not offering an invalid response to the Medicaid managed care enrollment questions on the NSAF. These samples would have been about 10% larger were it not for the fact that some Medicaid beneficiaries refused or were unable to answer the Medicaid managed care questions in NSAF. 8 The managed care questions are not asked of all Medicaid beneficiaries. To limit respondent burden and avoid unnecessary repetition, the Medicaid managed care question series was asked of a single Medicaid beneficiary in a family under the assumption that responses applied to all other Medicaid beneficiaries in the family. If a parent was enrolled in Medicaid, the Medicaid managed care information was collected for the parents' Medicaid coverage and assumed to apply to all Medicaid-covered children in the family. If only children were covered by Medicaid, information was collected on the older (age 6-17) child's plan and applied to younger children with Medicaid. If there were only children aged under 6, the Medicaid managed care information was collected for these individuals. 9 In models that include both the low-income privately insured and all Medicaid beneficiaries, we include a dummy variable that controls for Medicaid fee-for-service beneficiaries so that the coefficients on the Medicaid managed care variables capture differences relative to the privately insured group. 10 Another group of Medicaid enrollees-about 13% of adults and 15% of children-report Medicaid managed care enrollment according to the NSAF questions, but live in counties that the state survey shows as not requiring mandatory enrollment in PCCM or an HMO and as not having a voluntary Medicaid managed care program (Table 2). Despite this apparently incongruous pattern of responses, these individuals are included in the subsequent regression analyses. However, they are not included as part of the Medicaid managed care estimates or the Medicaid fee-forservice comparison group. We simply control for this group separately by including a dummy variable to control for membership in this group.
Notes
11 For children, the main difference between the two alternative comparison groups was that the significant positive relationship between HMO and HMO/PCCM and the probability of a dental visit was not evident when estimated without the potentially inconsistent responses. For adults, eliminating the potentially inconsistent responses from the comparison group removed the positive impact of HMOs on the probability of a physician visit and the negative impact of PCCM and HMO/PCCM on not having a usual source of care. 12 The marginal effects are computed as the average difference in the predicted probabilities between assuming that all people are in the comparison group vs. all people being covered by each type of Medicaid managed care. 13 The gain in preventive care for women in mandatory HMO/PCCM models may be seen as a positive aspect of these programs relative to other types of Medicaid managed care. Neither mandatory HMOs nor mandatory PCCM resulted in an improvement in preventive care for women. 14 These benefits of mandatory HMOs are somewhat surprising in light of the finding that, relative to the privately insured, children in these programs are less likely to have a physician as a usual source of care and more likely to seek care at a clinic. It may be that clinics are a better source of preventive care for children in mandatory HMOs than physician's offices are as a source of preventive care for the privately insured.
